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I. INTRODUCTION
While they may have been immoral, external military operations of past
empires often proved profitable and, therefore,justifiable on economic grounds.
Military actions abroad usually brought economic benefits not only to the
imperial ruling classes, but also (through "trickle-down" effects) to their
citizens. This was the case with both pre-capitalist empires of distant past and
the capitalist imperial powers of Europe. The United States, too, has often used
military power as a means for economic and territorial gains. These included
not only the expansion of its territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but also
the considerable non-territorial economic gains abroad, especially in the
immediate aftermath of Word War II.
This pattern of economic gains flowing from imperial military operations,
however, seems to have somewhat changed in recent years, especially in the
post-Cold War era. Moralities aside, U.S. military expeditions and operations
of late are not justifiable even on imperialistic economic grounds. Indeed,
* This paper draws heavily on the author's recently published book: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF U.S. MILITARISM (2006). The author is a professor of Economics at Drake University.
I. See generally PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC
CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987); CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF
EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY, AND THE END OF THE REPUBLIC (2004).
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escalating U.S. military expansions and aggressions have become ever more
wasteful and cost-inefficient in the post-Cold War period.
Evidence shows that even the widely-held claim that such expansions and
aggressions are driven largely by concerns for fossil fuels seems increasingly
dubious. Not surprisingly, official justifications for the post-Cold War military
actions have become increasingly fuzzy and shifting: humanitarian concerns,
international drug trafficking, global terrorism, militant Islam and, most
recently, democratic ideals.
The fact that external U.S. military operations of late have become
economically burdensome has also undermined traditional or classical theories
of imperialism, which tend to explain imperial military expeditions and
operations in terms of economic gains and objectives.
So, if it is not economic (or classic) imperialism, how are the escalating
military aggressions of the United States in recent years to be characterized?
What are the driving forces behind these military expansions, expeditions, and
operations?
Official explanations such as weapons of mass destruction, threats to the
national security or interests of the United States, or spreading democracy
worldwide, can now easily be dispensed with as flimsy, harebrained pretexts for
war and militarism.
Critics have offered a number of explanations. One of the most popular
explanations attributes the rise of unilateral U.S. military adventures to the
ascendance to power of the cabal of the so-called neoconservative militarists.
A second widely-shared view, especially outside of the United States, attributes
the recent rise of U.S. militarism, especially the invasion of Iraq, to the
geopolitical imperatives of Israel. The third, and perhaps most widely-held,
view of the surge in U.S. military expansions in the Middle East and central
Asia is that the recently heightened military activities in those regions are
prompted by U.S. designs to gain access to more and cheaper sources of gas and
oil.
Without denying the contributory roles of these factors, this study points
to a more crucial force behind the drive to war and militarism: the powerful
beneficiaries of military industries and war dividends, or, as the late President
Eisenhower put it, the military-industrial complex and related influential
interests that are vested in the business of war and military expansion.'
Drawing on a number of preeminent theories and empirical accounts on
imperialism and militarism3 , this study makes a clear distinction between
2. Dwight Eisenhower, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 17, 1961), available at
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2006).
3. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 1; JOHNSON, supra note 1. See generally SIDNEY LENS, THE
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1970); ALFRED VAGTS, A HISTORY OF MILITARISM: CIVILIAN AND
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"classical" or economic imperialism on the one hand, and militaristic, cost-
inefficient, or parasitic imperialism on the other.
Historically, parasitic military imperialism has almost always evolved out
of a higher stage of economic or classical imperialism-a prolonged reliance
on military power for economic, territorial, or geopolitical gains gradually
creates a dynamic out of which evolves a large standing military apparatus that
tends to perpetuate itself-and develop into a bureaucratic military empire.
Whereas military force in the economic sense of imperialism is usually a means
for economic, territorial, or geopolitical gains, under parasitic military
imperialism, it becomes an end in itself.
Accordingly, as the U.S. military establishment has grown in size, it has
also evolved in quality and character: it is no longer just a means for economic
or geopolitical gains but, perhaps more importantly, an end-nay, an
empire-in itself. Rising militarization of U.S. foreign policy in recent years
is driven not so much by some general or abstract national interests, as it is by
the special interests vested in military industries and related businesses, which
need an atmosphere of war and militarism in order to justify their lion's share
of the public money. This helps explain why since World War H powerful
beneficiaries of war dividends have almost always reacted negatively to
discussions of international cooperation and tension reduction, or ddtente.4
Thus, for example, in the late 1940s and early 195 Os, the Korean War and
the "communist threat" were used as pretexts by the proponents of military
buildup to overrule those who called for limits on military spending following
the end of World War II. Representatives of the military-industrial complex,
disproportionately ensconced in the State Department, succeeded in having
President Truman embark on his famous overhaul of the U.S. foreign policy,
which drastically increased the Pentagon budget and expanded the military-
industrial establishment.
Likewise, in the face of the 1970s tension-reducing negotiations with the
Soviet Union, representatives of the military-industrial complex rallied around
Cold Warrior think tanks, such as the Committee on the Present Danger, and
successfully sabotaged those discussions. Instead, once again, by invoking the
"communist threat," they managed to reinforce the relatively weakened tensions
with the Soviet Union to such new heights that it came to be known as the
MILITARY (Meridian Books, Inc. 1959) (1937); SEYMOUR MELMAN, PROFITS WITHOUT PRODUCTION (1983);
ANDREW BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM (2005).
4. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. HARTUNG, HOwMUCH AREYOUMAKING ON THE WAR, DADDY? (2003);
JOHNSON, supra note 1; JAMES MANN, THE RISE OF vULCANS: THE HISTORY OF BUSH'S WAR CABINET
(2004).
2006]
70 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
Second Cold War-hence, the early 1980s dramatic "rearming of America," as
President Reagan put it.'
Similarly, when the collapse of the Soviet system and the subsequent
discussions of "peace dividends" in the United States threatened the interests
of the military-industrial conglomerates, their representatives invented "new
external sources of danger to U.S. interests" and successfully substituted them
for the "threat of communism" of the Cold War era. These "new, post-Cold
War sources of threat" are said to stem from the "unpredictable, unreliable
regional powers of the Third World," from the so-called "rogue states," and
more recently from "global terrorism" and Islamic fundamentalism.6
This tendency of the beneficiaries of war dividends to foment international
convulsions in order to justify the continuous hemorrhaging of the Pentagon
budget, also helps explain why the Bush Administration, under the heavy
influence of the Defense Department, viewed the 9/11 tragedy as an opportunity
for further militarization. The monstrous attacks of 9/11 were treated not as
crimes-requiring law enforcement, international police, intelligence gathering,
and public diplomacy efforts and operations-but as war on America. Once it
was thus established that the United States was "at war," military buildup
followed accordingly.
7
Viewed in this light, militaristic tendencies to wars abroad can be seen
largely as reflections of the metaphorical fights over allocation of public
finance at home; of a subtle or insidious strategy to redistribute national
resources in favor of the wealthy; to cut public spending on socio-economic
infrastructure; and to reverse the New Deal reforms by expanding military
spending.
The economic burden of the recent wars of choice go beyond their
opportunity costs in terms of undermining public capital formation (both human
capital such as health and education, and physical capital for infrastructure such
as roads, bridges, mass transit, dams, levees, and the like), which is crucial to
the ideals of long-term economic growth and social prosperity. Equally
burdensome, these wars also cost non-military U.S. transnational capital
external sales markets and investment opportunities as a result of various
blowbacks, especially consumer backlashes, abroad.
5. See, e.g., FRED HALLIDAY, MAKING OF THE SECOND COLD WAR (1983); TRILATERALISM
(1980).
6. Seegenerally SHEILA RYAN, Power Projection in the Middle East, in MOBILIZING DEMOCRACY
41-69 (Greg Bates ed., Common Courage Press 1991) (1990); SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1997); MANN, supra note 4.
7. RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA'S PURSUIT OF ITS ENEMIES
SINCE 9/11 (2006); MANN, supra note 4; THOMAS RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE
IN IRAQ (2006).
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In the first part of this study, I will examine the economic implications and
consequences of the recent external military adventures for U.S. global markets.
After showing that such military adventures cannot be justified on the grounds
of broader national economic interests, I will then examine the powerful special
interests that are dangerously vested in the business of war and are, therefore,
responsible for the tendency to permanent war and militarism.
II. THE IMPACT OF RECENT WARS OF CHOICE ON U.S. GLOBAL MARKETS
Militarism has always tried to disguise its interests as national interests
and justify its parasitic role and existentialist military adventures on grounds
that such military operations will lead to economic gains for the imperium and
the nation as a whole. This despite the fact that military adventures by
beneficiaries of the business of war are often costly economic burdens that tend
to be at odds, not only with the interests of the masses of the poor and working
people, but also with those of non-military transnational capitalists who pay
taxes to finance such adventures while losing sales and investment
opportunities in foreign markets to international competition, and lose political
and economic stability in global markets.
A. War and the Non-Military U.S. Transnational Capital
Recent U.S. military build-up, and its unilateral aggressions abroad, have
increasingly become economic burdens, not only because they devour a
disproportionately large share of national resources, but also because such
adventurous operations tend to create instability in international markets,
subvert long-term global investment, and increase energy or fuel costs.
Furthermore, the resentment and hostilities that unprovoked aggressions
generate in foreign lands, are bound to create backlash at the consumer level.
For example, the Iranian-made beverage Zam Zam Cola has in recent years
made significant inroads into the traditional markets of the U.S. brands Coca-
Cola and Pepsi, not only in the Middle East, but also in Europe and elsewhere.8
A Business Week report pointed out in the immediate aftermath of the U.S.
invasion of Iraq that the Muslim world, Europe, and elsewhere "there have been
calls for boycotts of American brands as well as demonstrations at symbols of
U.S. business, such as McDonald's corporation."9 A leading Middle East
business journal, AME Info, reported in its April 8, 2004 issue:
8. Coke and Pepsi Battle it Out, AME INFO., Apr. 8, 2004, available at
http://www.ameinfo.com/news/Detailed/37492.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2006) [hereinafter AME INFO.].
9. Michael J. Mandel, et al., How War Will Shape the Economy, BUSINESS WEEK, Apr. 14,2003,
at 29-32.
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[i]n 2002, a cluster of Arab organizations asked Muslims to shun
goods from America, seen as an enemy of Islam and a supporter of
Israel. In Bahrain, the AI-Montazah supermarket chain, for example,
boosted sales by pulling about 1,000 US products off its shelves, and
other grocers followed suit. Coca-Cola and Pepsi, sometimes
considered unflattering shorthand for the United States, took the brunt
of the blow. Coca-Cola admitted that the boycott trimmed some $40
million off profits in the Gulf in 2002.'0
The report further pointed out that in recent years, a number of "Muslim
colas" have appeared in the Middle Eastern/Muslim markets. "Don't Drink
Stupid, Drink Committed, read the labels of Mecca Cola, from France....
Iran's Zam Zam Cola, originally concocted for Arab markets, has spread to
countries including France and the United States."' "I The report also indicated
that "US exports to the Middle East dropped $31 billion from 1998-2002.
Branded, value-added goods-all the stuff easily recognized as
American-were hit the hardest."' 2 Quoting Grant Smith, director of IRmep, a
leading Washington-based think tank on Middle Eastern affairs, the report
concluded: "Our piece of the pie is shrinking, and it's because of our degraded
image."13
Evidence shows that foreign policy-induced losses of the U.S. market
share in global markets goes beyond the Middle East and/or the Muslim
world."4 According to a December 2004 survey of 8,000 international
consumers carried out by Global Market Insite (GMI) Inc., one-third of all
consumers in Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United
Kingdom said that "U.S. foreign policy, particularly the 'war on terror' and the
occupation of Iraq, constituted their strongest impression of the United
States."' 5 In addition, "[b]rands closely identified with the U.S., such as
Marlboro cigarettes, America Online (AOL), McDonald's, American Airlines,
and Exxon-Mobil, are particularly at risk."' 6
Furthermore, "[t]wenty percent of respondents in Europe and Canada said
they consciously avoided buying U.S. products as a protest against those
10. AME INFO., supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Jim Lobe, Poll: War Bad for Business, ANTIWAR.COM, Dec. 30, 2004, available at
http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=4235 (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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policies."' 7 Commenting on the results of the survey, Dr. Mitchell Eggers,
GMI's Chief Operating Officer and chiefpollster, pointed out, "[u]nfortunately,
current American foreign policy is viewed by international consumers as a
significant negative, when it used to be a positive."' 8
Kevin Roberts, chief executive of advertising giant Saatchi & Saatchi,
likewise expressed concern about global consumer backlash against militaristic
U.S. foreign policy when he told the Financial Times that he "believed
consumers in Europe and Asia are becoming increasingly resistant to having
'brand America rammed down their throats. ""' Similarly, Simon Anholt, author
of Brand America, told the British trade magazine Marketing Week that "four
more years of Bush's foreign policy could have grave consequences for U.S.
companies' international market share."20
Despite these damages and threats to global U.S. market share,
beneficiaries of war dividends claim that their military operations abroad would
yield economic benefits for the nation as a whole because, they claim, such
military actions would help spread unhindered market mechanism, remove
obstacles to transnational corporations and keep foreign markets and resources
open to their business operations. Recently, such assertions are frequently
interspersed with claims of "spreading democracy worldwide." In this fashion,
beneficiaries of war and militarism try to disguise the colossal military buildup,
which has become an end-indeed, an empire-in itself, as a means for
spreading democracy and achieving international economic advantage.
Such claims are made both directly through Pentagon policy documents
and indirectly through militaristic surrogate think tanks such as the Project for
New American Century (PNAC) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).
In recent years, such allegations are also made through a number of policy
papers written by the Bush administration.2
Evidence, as well as logic and common sense, suggest, however, that not
only is the assertion that continued military buildup would help spread political
and economic freedom is hollow and disingenuous, but that war and militarism,
as strategies to achieve these lofty ideals, are counterproductive, especially in
the era of integrated and interdependent global markets. Not only is militarism
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Lobe, supra note 14.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., GEORGE W. BUSH, THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last
visited Sept. 9, 2006); THOMAS DONNELLY, PROJECT FOR NEW AMERICAN CENTURY, REBUILDING
AMERICA'S DEFENSES: STRATEGY, FORCES, AND RESOURCES FOR A NEW CENTURY (2000), available at
http://www.newamericancentury.orgfRebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
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inherently at odds with freedom, but it is also burdensome economically-
except, of course, for the beneficiaries of the business of war.
Economic liberalism, which has in the last few decades been called
neoliberalism, is in fact antithetical to militarism. It shuns militarism not only
because militarism is costly and wasteful, but also because it is disruptive to
international economics and would therefore undermine global capitalist
profitability-except for military industries and war-related businesses.
Accordingly, economic liberalism/neoliberalism tends to rely on market, not
military, force to maintain international economic superiority.
As this strategy of relying on market efficiency, instead of military power,
in pursuit of international economic advantage tends to expose a large military
establishment as parasitic and redundant, it also helps explain the inherent
conflict between militarism and liberalism/neoliberalism. The strategy further
helps explain why beneficiaries of war and militarism, the military
establishment and the neoconservative militarists in and around the Bush
administration, were so hostile to Bill Clinton and his neoliberal economic
policies. In addition, the conflicting interests of militarism and neoliberalism
help explain why these beneficiaries stifled the widespread calls for "peace
dividends" and military downsizing in the immediate aftermath of the collapse
of the Berlin Wall.22
Perhaps more importantly, the conflicting interests of militarism and those
of non-military transnational capital help explicate why representatives of the
latter interests have not encouraged or embraced the Bush administration's
policy of unilateral militarism. Although non-military transnational interests
have not expressed a strong opposition to the administration's drive to war, they
have nonetheless shown some tepid wariness toward it. As shown later in this
study, even big oil, the major but largely incidental beneficiaries of war, did not
support the war on Iraq.
This is not to say that the American oil companies, and other non-military
transnational corporations, would not welcome the spoils of war in the form of
oil price hikes, or in the form of acquisition of asset ownership that would result
from privatization of previously-public industries and enterprises that might
ensue from the policy of "regime change" in a country like Iraq. Indeed, there
is evidence that, as soon as Iraq came under U.S. occupation, many such
corporations from agribusiness, transportation, telecommunications, financial
services, and power, rushed their representatives to Baghdad to participate in
the contracting and privatization bonanza that followed the occupation.23
22. See, e.g., James Mann, The True Rationale? It's a Decade Old, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar.
7, 2004, at B02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A35472-
2004Mar6?language=printer (last visited Sept. 9, 2006); RYAN, supra note 6.
23. See, e.g., Naomi Prins, MakingaKilling in lraq, LEFT BuSiNESS OBSERVER, Aug. 2003, at 2-3.
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Nonetheless, there is no evidence that major oil and other non-military
transnational corporations, instigated or encouraged the invasion because non-
military transnational corporations including big oil, prefers stability and
predictability in global markets to short-term spoils of war.
Ordinarily, representatives of non-military, transnational capital prefer
multilateral economic policies ofneoliberalism to unilateral actions of the Bush
administration because they are afraid that war and militarism might subvert
international economics and undermine long-term U.S. competitiveness.
Expressing such concerns ofneoliberalism, Business Week carried an article on
the eve of the invasion of Iraq that read:
Washington's unilateral tendencies have also created nervousness in
global financial markets on which the U.S. has become dependent. It
has made the multilateral trade negotiations-in which so many
American companies have a huge stake-a secondary priority....
Financing foreign wars and boosting homeland security is bound to
erode U.S. economic vitality.24
Three weeks later, in another article titled "How War Will Shape the
Economy" the magazine wrote: ".... the real threat [of the war] is to the rapid
productivity growth of the 1990s, which may be tough to sustain in an unsettled
and hostile world. New Economy growth depends on globalization and
innovation, both of which could be dampened by war and a potentially difficult
aftermath."25 Any slowdown in the free flow of trade, people, and technologies
could significantly dampen innovation and growth in the U.S. and abroad. As
stated in Business Week, "[w]hat we do know is that the market-driven growth
the U.S. enjoyed in the 1990s thrived on an atmosphere of global peace. The
war in Iraq, the tough rebuilding task ahead, and the rise in global tension all
signal to an end to that fertile era."26
Writing in the October 27, 2003 issue of the Star Tribune, Ron Bosrock
of the Global Institute of St. John's University likewise expressed anxiety over
negative economic consequences that might follow from the Bush
administration's policies of unilateral military operations and economic
sanctions:
In the meantime, the U.S. economy, in order to grow, will have to
continue to expand into the global markets while dealing with this
ever-increasing competition [from EU, China, India] .... If this new
24. Geoffrey E. Garten, Bush 's Guns-and-Butter Dilemma, BUSiNESS WEEK, Mar. 17, 2003, at
66-76.
25. Mandel, supra note 9.
26. Id.
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U.S. foreign policy [of militarism] leads to decades of upheaval, how
will U.S. businesses convince their future global partners that they
should look to them for stable business opportunities-as opposed to
all those new competitors waiting in the wings?27
Concerns of this nature have prompted a broad spectrum of non-military
business interests to form coalitions of trade associations that are designed to
lobby foreign policy makers against unilateral U. S. military aggressions abroad.
One such anti-militarist alliance of American businesses is USA*ENGAGE. It
is a coalition of nearly 700 small and large businesses, agriculture groups and
trade associations working to seek alternatives to the proliferation of unilateral
U.S. foreign policy actions and to promote the benefits of U.S. engagement
abroad. The coalition's statement of principles points out:
American values are best advanced by engagement of American
business and agriculture in the world, not by ceding markets to
foreign competition. Helping train workers, building roads, telephone
systems, and power plants in poorer nations, promoting free
enterprise-these activities improve the lives of people worldwide
and support American values. Unfortunately the real difference made
by American companies and workers through such day-to-day activity
is lost in the emotion of political debates, where there is pressure to
make a symbolic gesture [a unilateral foreign policy action], even if
it won't work.2
Non-military business interests' anxiety over the Bush administration's
unilateral foreign policy measures is, of course, rooted in their negatively-
affected financial balance sheets by those actions: "Hundreds of companies
blame the Iraq war for poor financial results in 2003, many warning that
continued U.S. military involvement there could harm this year's performance,"
pointed out James Cox of USA Today.29 In a relatively comprehensive survey
of the economic impact of the war, published in the July 14, 2004 issue of the
paper, Cox further wrote: "In recent regulatory filings at the Securities and
Exchange Commission, airlines, home builders, broadcasters, mortgage
27. Ron Bosrock, The Project for the New American Century: Why American Business Should
Care, STAR TRIBUNE, OCT. 27, 2003, available at http://www.oldamericancentury.org/pipermail/
poacnewsletter-oldamericancentury.org/2003-October/000059.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2007).
28. USA Engage, available at http://www.usaengage.org/about_us/index.html (last visited Sept.
11,2006).
29. James Cox, Financially Ailing Companies Point to Iraq War, USA TODAY, July 14, 2001,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/2004-06-14-iraqx.htm?POE=click-refer (last
visited Sept. 11, 2006).
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providers, mutual funds and others say the war was directly to blame for lower
revenue and profits last year., 30 Many businesses blamed the war and
international political turbulence as a 'risk factor' that threatened their sales:
"The war led to sharp decreases in business and leisure travel, say air carriers,
travel services, casino operators, restaurant chains and hotel owners."'"
The survey covered a number of airlines including Delta Airlines, JetBlue,
Northwest Airlines and Alaska Airlines, all of which blamed the war for a drop
in air travel. Related industries such as travel agencies, hotels, restaurants, and
resort and casino operations all suffered losses accordingly.32
The mutual funds managers who were interviewed in the USA Today
survey included David J. Galvan of Wayne Hummer Income Fund who wrote
(in a letter to shareholders), "The war in Iraq created a quagmire for
corporations." Vintage Mutual Funds likewise concluded that "the price of
these commitments [in Iraq and Afghanistan] may be more than the American
public had expected or is willing to tolerate."33 In a Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) filing, Domenic Colasacco, manager of the Boston
Balanced Fund, characterized the ongoing U.S. occupation of Iraq as "sad and
increasingly risky."34 Even technology giants such as Cisco, PeopleSoft and
Hewlett-Packard that tend to benefit from military spending expressed concerns
that "hostilities in Iraq hurt results or could harm performance."35
For example, managers at Hewlett-Packard complained that:
potential for future attacks, the national and international responses
to attacks or perceived threats to national security, and other actual or
potential conflicts or wars, including the ongoing military operations
in Iraq, have created many economic and political uncertainties that
could adversely affect our business, results of operations and stock
price in ways that we cannot presently predict.36
Other companies that were specifically mentioned in the survey as having
complained about the "whiplash from the Iraq conflict" included home builders
Hovnanian and Cavalier homes, casino company Mandalay Resort Group,
retailer Restoration Hardware, cosmetics giant Est6e Lauder, eyewear retailer
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Cox, supra note 29.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Cole, Longs Drug Stores, golf club maker Callaway, and H&Q Life Sciences
Investors.37
B. War and Military-Based Industries and Businesses
While thousands of non-military businesses have suffered from losses and
stagnation due to war and militarism, war-based industries and related business
have been reaping the benefits of a war-time bonanza thanks to drastic increases
in military spending under President Bush-officially a forty-five percent
increase in real terms over what he inherited in 2001. For example, the above-
cited USA Today survey revealed that, as expected,
Several companies have reported a boost from sales to the military or
contracts stemming from the Iraqi reconstruction effort. The war has
lifted sales of: gas masks from Mine Safety Appliances; bio-weapons
detection kits and training from Response Biomedical; air cargo from
Atlas Air; port dredging by JDC Soil Management; packaging by
TriMas; body armor and vehicle protection kits from Armor Holding;
telecom services and communications gear from Globalnet, CopyTele
and I-Sector.38
Escalating Pentagon appropriations and the war-time "unity" on Capitol
Hill have created an environment in which war industries can have their cake
and eat it too: continuing to make money on the weapons systems of the Cold
War era while reaping the benefits of a war time bonanza of new defense
contracts. The surge in the Pentagon budget, and the need to replace weapons
used in Afghanistan and Iraq, has prompted weapons manufacturers to
drastically accelerate production. For example,
Boeing added a second shift of workers to boost production of its
Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs)-the most widely used smart
bomb in the Afghan war. Raytheon, best known for its Tomahawk
missile, added a third shift and announced that production for its
laser-guided bomb has been accelerated by five months.39
While the giant manufacturers of warfare products are the obvious
beneficiaries of the heightened war and militarism, there is also a whole host
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Michelle Ciarocca, Post-9/1 1 Economic Windfalls for Arms Manufacturers, FOREIGN POLICY
IN Focus, Sept. 2002, available at http://www.91 ldigitalarchive.org/objects/50.pdf (last visited Sept. 11,
2006).
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of war-related smaller businesses that have recently spun around the Pentagon
and the Homeland Security apparatus in order to cash in on the Pentagon's
spending bonanza. For example, "Air Structures is introducing fortified vinyl
domes for quarantining infected communities in the aftermath of a potential
bioterror attack, Visionics is looking into designing facial recognition
technology, and PointSource Technologies is developing a sensor to detect
biological agents in the air or water. '
There are also many less visible Pentagon contractors that are just as
handsomely benefiting from military expansion. These are the somewhat
surreptitious, private contractors that operate on the periphery of U.S. foreign
policy by training foreign "security forces," or by "fighting terrorism." Often
these private military firms are formed by retired Special Forces personnel
seeking to market their military expertise to the Pentagon, the State Department,
the CIA, or foreign governments.
For example, MPRI, one of the largest and most active of these firms,
which "has trained militaries throughout the world under contract to the
Pentagon,"' was founded by the former Army Chief of Staff Carl Vuono and
seven other retired generals. The fortunes of these military training contractors,
or "modern-day mercenary companies," like those of the manufacturers of
military hardware, have skyrocketed by virtue of heightened war and militarism
under President Bush. For instance, "the per share price of stocks in L-3
Communications, which owns MPRI, has more than doubled" in recent years. 42
Referring to the fierce competition among these private military training
companies to win Pentagon contracts, Pete Singer, an Olin Fellow in the
Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution in Washington,
points out, "[t]his is big business among these companies. They are furiously
bidding on involvement in Afghanistan and the war on terrorism. The minute
the Pentagon started to use the phrase 'a program to train and equip the Afghan
army,' buzzers went off." 43 The Bush Administration's open-ended "war on
terrorism" promises to be a boon for these companies.
The fact that the United States' war industry flourishes on war and
international political tensions has also been reflected in the stock prices of the
military-based industries in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The attacks led to
the collapse and temporary shut down of the Wall Street stock market. When
it reopened several days later, the few companies showing increased value were
40. Id.
41. Esther Schrader, Companies Capitalize on War on Terror, LOS ANGELESTIMES, APR. 14,2002,
available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-041402trainers.story (last visited Sept. 11,
2006).
42. Id.
43. Id
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the giant military contractors: Alliant Tech Systems, Northrop Grumman,
Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. As the U.S. military's biggest supplier,
Lockheed Martin's share value rose by a staggering 30 percent. Other top
gainers for the week of September 17-21, 2001, included military and space
contractors like Raytheon (+37%), L-3 Communications (+35.8%), Alliant
Techsystems (+23.5%), and Northrop Grumman (+21.2%)."
III. BEHIND THE DRIVE TO WAR AND MILITARISM
The sample evidence provided in the preceding pages shows that while
military industries and war-related businesses have benefited substantially from
the heightened pace of war and militarism, many more non-military
transnational corporations are losing sales and investment opportunities in
global markets due to an anti-American consumer backlash and the war
atmosphere of uncertainty and instability. Not surprisingly, powerful
beneficiaries of war dividends, the military-industrial conglomerates, have
served as the major (but largely subtle or submerged) driving forces behind the
heightened militarism of recent years and the concomitant rise in unilateral
wars of aggression.
What makes this tendency of the military-industrial complex to war and
militarism especially dangerous is that it is driven by existential, intrinsic, or
systemic imperatives: the powerful interests that are vested in the complex get
economic and political nourishment from war and international political
convulsions. It is due to this inherently ominous threat to world peace and
instability-as well as to the principles of republicanism and ideals of civil
liberties at home-that the late President Eisenhower's prescient warning that
"we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence.., by the
military-industrial complex" ' is even more relevant today than when it was
issued nearly half a century ago.
Despite the crucial role of the beneficiaries of war dividends in the rising
militarization of U.S. foreign policy, most critics of the Bush administration's
policies of war and militarism seem to be oblivious to this perilous role.
Instead, they tend to place the blame largely on: the oil and/or energy interests,
the cabal of neoconservative forces, and the hard-line Zionist forces that lobby
for the geopolitical interests of the state of Israel. In the following pages I shall
challenge all these three widely-held views of the forces behind war and
militarism, and argue, instead, that the roaring U.S. war machine is powered
primarily by the military industry conglomerates.
44. Ciarrocca, supra note 39.
45. Eisenhower, supra note 2.
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A. The Role of Big Oil
A most widely-cited factor behind the Bush administration's drive to war
is said to be oil. "No Blood for Oil" has been a rallying cry for most of the
opponents of the war. Yet, such claims cannot be supported by facts. Major oil
companies have come (in recent years and decades) to prefer peace, stability,
and predictability in global markets to war and instability. It is true that big oil,
like the arms industry, has handsomely benefited form the heightened tempo of
war and militarism. There is no hard evidence, however, that major oil interests
encouraged or embraced the Bush administrations drive to war and militarism.
On the contrary, evidence shows that for the last quarter century or so oil
interests have not favored war and turbulence in the Middle East, including the
current invasion of Iraq. Major oil companies, along with many other non-
military transnational corporations, have lobbied both the Clinton and Bush
administrations in support of changing the aggressive, militaristic U.S. policy
toward countries like Iran, Iraq and Libya in favor of establishing normal, non-
confrontational business and diplomatic relations.46
The claim that attributes the Bush administration's drive to war to the
influence of major oil companies tends to rest more on precedent and
perception than reality. Part of the perception is due to the exaggerated notion
that both President Bush and Vice President Cheney were "oil men" before
coming to the White House. However, George W. Bush was never more than
an unsuccessful petty oil prospector and Dick Cheney headed a company, the
notorious Halliburton, that sold (and still sells) services to oil companies and
the Pentagon.
The larger part of the perception, however, stems from the fact that oil
companies do benefit from oil price hikes that result from war and political
turbulence in the Middle East. Such benefits are, however, largely incidental.
Surely, American oil companies would welcome the spoils of the war (in the
form of oil price hikes) in Iraq or anywhere else in the world. From the largely
incidental oil price hikes that follow war and political convulsion, some
observers automatically conclude that big oil must have been behind the war.47
Yet, there is no evidence that, at least in the case of the current invasion of Iraq,
oil companies pushed for or supported the war.
46. See, e.g., Cyrus Bina, The American Tragedy: The Quagmire of War, Rhetoric of Oil, and the
Conundrum of Hegemony, JOURNAL OF IRANIAN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.urpe.org/bina-oil_2.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2006); Melinda K. Ruby, Is Oil the Driving Force
to War? (Spring 2004) (unpublished senior thesis, Department of Economics and Finance, Drake University)
(on file with author).
47. See generally JOHNATHAN NITZAN & SHIMSHON BICHLER, THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF ISRAEL (2002).
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On the contrary, there is strong evidence that, in fact, oil companies did
not welcome the war because they prefer stability and predictability to periodic
oil spikes that follow war and political convulsion: "[1]ooking back over the
last 20 years, there is plenty of evidence showing the industry's push for
stability and cooperation with Middle Eastern countries and leaders, and the
U.S. government's drive for hegemony works against the oil industry." '48 As
Thierry Desmarest, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of France's giant oil
company, TotalFinaElf, put it, "[a] few months of cash generation is not a big
deal. Stable, not volatile, prices and a $25 price (per barrel) would be
convenient for everyone. 49
It is true that for a long time, from the beginning of Middle Eastern oil
exploration and discovery in the early twentieth century until the mid-1970s,
colonial and/or imperial powers controlled oil either directly, or through control
of oil producing countries-at times, even by military force. But that pattern of
imperialist exploitation of global markets and resources has changed now. Most
of the current theories of imperialism and hegemony that continue invoking that
old pattern of big oil behavior, tend to suffer from an ahistorical perspective.
Today, even physically occupying and controlling another country's oil
fields will not necessarily be beneficial to oil interests. Not only will military
adventures place the operations of current energy projects at jeopardy, but they
will also make the future plans precarious and unpredictable. Big oil interests
know this, and that is why they did not countenance the war on Iraq:
"The big oil companies were not enthusiastic about the Iraqi war,"
says Fareed Mohamedi of PFC Energy, an energy consultancy firm
based in Washington, D.C., that advises petroleum firms.
"Corporations like Exxon-Mobil and Chevron-Texaco want stability,
and this is not what Bush is providing in Iraq and the Gulf region,"
adds Mohamedi.
During the past few decades, major oil companies have consistently
opposed U.S. policies and military threats against countries like Iran, Iraq, and
Libya. They have, time and again, lobbied U.S. foreign policy makers for the
establishment of peaceful relations and diplomatic rapprochement with those
countries. The Iran-Libya Sanction Act of 1996 (ILSA) is a strong testament to
the fact that oil companies nowadays view wars, economic sanctions, and
48. Ruby, supra note 46, at 10.
49. Id. at 13.
50. See Roger Burbach, Bush Ideologues vs. Big Oil: The Iraq Game Gets Even Stranger,
available at http://www.counterpunch.orgburbach10032003.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
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international political tensions as harmful to their long-term business interests
and, accordingly, strive for peace, not war, in international relations.5'
In May of 1997, for example, major U.S. oil companies such as Conoco,
Exxon, Atlantic Richfield, and Occidental Petroleum joined other non-military
U.S. transnational corporations to create an anti-sanction coalition. 2 Earlier that
same year Conoco's Chief Executive Archie Dunham publicly took a stance
against unilateral U.S. sanctions by stating that "U.S. companies, not rogue
regimes, are the ones that suffer when the United States imposes economic
sanctions."53 Texaco officials have also argued that the U.S. can be more
effective in bringing about change in other countries by allowing U.S.
companies to do business with those countries instead of imposing economic
sanctions that tend to be counterproductive.54
B. "Coalition of the Willing" to Pursue War and Militarism: The Military-
Industrial-Zionist-Neoconservative Alliance
A widely-shared view attributes the Bush administration's militaristic
foreign policy to the influence ofneoconservative forces and the power of their
ideology: the small but influential cabal of starry-eyed ideologues, bent on
spreading the U.S. economic and political system, along with American power
and influence, managed to single-handedly drive the country to war through lies
and false pretexts. Some of these critics compare the "ideologically-driven"
neoconservative militarists to the idealistic Jacobinic forces of more than two
centuries ago in Europe, the eighteenth century French revolutionaries whose
intention to remake Europe in revolutionary France's image launched the
Napoleonic Wars. Proponents of this thesis further argue that the neocon-
servatives' domination of the Bush administration's foreign policy amounted
to a political coup d'etat.55
While this argument may not be altogether false, it is woefully deficient.
By placing an inordinately high emphasis on pure or abstract ideology and on
political personas or the role of individuals, the argument tends to lose sight of
the bigger, but largely submerged, picture: the powerful military-industrial-
Likud interests-the real architects of war and militarism--that lie behind the
51. Ruby, supra note 46, at 14-18.
52. David Ivanovich, Conoco 's Chief Blasts Sanctions, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 12, 1997, at
Cl.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Paul Craig Roberts, Neo-Jacobins Push for World War IV, available at
http://www.lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts8.html (last visited Sept. 11,2006); Gordon Prather, Neo-Crazy
Coup d'Etat, available at http://www.antiwar.com/orig/prather.php?articleid=2343 (last visited Sept. 11,
2006).
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faqade ofneoconservative figures in and around the Bush administration. There
is clear evidence that the leading neoconservative figures have been long-time
political activists who have worked through think tanks set up to serve either
as the armaments lobby, or the Likud (militant Zionist partisans) lobby, or
both-going back to the 1990s, 1980s and, in some cases, 1970s. These
corporate-backed militaristic think tanks include the American Enterprise
Institute, Project for the New American Century, Center for Security Policy,
Middle East Media Research Institute, Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, Middle East Forum, National Institute for Public Policy, and Jewish
Institute for National Security Affairs. There is also evidence that the major
components of the Bush administration's foreign policy, including the war on
Iraq, were designed long before George W. Bush arrived in the White House-
largely at the drawing boards of these think thanks, often in collaboration
directly, or indirectly, with the Pentagon and the arms lobby. Even a cursory
look at the records of these militaristic think tanks-their membership, their
financial sources, their institutional structures, and the like-shows that they
are set up to essentially serve as institutional fronts to camouflage the
incestuous relationship between the Pentagon, its major contractors, and the
Israeli lobby on the one hand, and militaristic neoconservative politicians, on
the other.56
Take the Center for Security Policy (CSP), for example: "[a] sixth of the
Center's revenue comes directly from defense corporations... CSP boasts that
[there are] no fewer than twenty-two former advisory board members or close
associates in the Bush administration."57 The Center's alumni in key posts in
the Bush administration include its former chair of the board, Douglas Feith,
who served as Undersecretary of Defense for policy, Pentagon Comptroller Dov
Zakheim, former Defense Policy Board Chair Richard Perle, and longtime
friend and financial supporter former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.58 In
its 1998 annual report, the center listed virtually every weapons-maker that had
supported it from its founding, from Lockheed, Martin Marietta, Northrop,
Grumman, and Boeing, to the later 'merged' incarnations of same-Lockheed
Martin, Northrop Grumman, and so forth.59
56. See generally HARTUNG, supra note 4; William D. Hartung & Michelle Ciarrocca, The
Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex, 24 MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (Jan./Feb. 2003), available at
http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2003/03jan-feb/jan-febO3corp2.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006); MANN,
supra note 4; DiLip HIRO, SECRETS AND LIES: OPERATION IRAQUI FREEDOM AND AFTER (Nation Books
2004) (2003).
57. See generally Hartung & Ciarrocca, supra note 56.
58. Id.
59. See generally Hartung & Ciarrocca, supra note 56; MANN, supra note 4.
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Likewise, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), an influential
Washington think tank and a major lobbying force for the military-industrial-
Zionist alliance, can boast of being the metaphorical alma mater of a number
of powerful members of the Bush administration. For example, Vice President
Dick Cheney and his wife Lynne Cheney, State Department arms control
official John Bolton (former U.S. ambassador to the UN), and former chair of
the Defense Policy Board, Richard Perle, have all had long-standing ties with
the Institute.6" The Institute played a key role in promoting Ahmed Chalabi's
group of Iraqi exiles, the Iraqi National Congress (INC), as a major Iraqi
opposition force that the Iraqi people would welcome as an alternative to the
Saddam Hussein regime once the Untied States had overthrown that regime.6'
"From 1998 on, when there was U.S. government money openly available to
support the Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein due to the AEI-backed Iraqi
Liberation Act, Chalabi's INC grabbed the bulk of the funding., 62 In return, the
INC, working closely with the AEI, played an important role in the justification
of the invasion of Iraq. It served, for example, as a major source of (largely
fabricated) intelligence for the civilian militarists of the Pentagon whenever
they found the intelligence gathered by the CIA and the State Department at
odds with their plans of invading Iraq.63
Another example of the interlocking network of neoconservative forces in
the Bush administration and the militaristic think tanks that are dedicated to the
advancement of the military-industrial-Zionist agenda is reflected in the
affiliation of a number of influential members of the administration with the
Jewish Institute for the National Security Affairs (JINSA). JINSA is on record
in its support of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and against the Oslo
Accord.6' "In its fervent support for the hard-line, pro-settlement, anti-
Palestinian Likud-style policies in Israel, JINSA has essentially recommended
that 'regime change' in Iraq should be just the beginning of a cascade of
toppling dominoes in the Middle East.,
65
JINSA has influential friends either as liaisons with or members of the
Bush administration.66 For example, Douglas Feith, Assistant Secretary of
Defense during the first term of the Bush administration, is a former JINSA
advisor. 67 General Jay Garner, the initial head of the U.S. occupation authority
60. HARTUNG, supra note 4, at 103.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 104.
63. See generally id.
64. Id. at 111.
65. Id. at.109.
66. HARTUNG, supra note 4, at 110.
67. Id.
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in Iraq, is also a former JINSA advisory board member.68 JINSA advisor
Michael Ladeen, who also unofficially advises the Bush administration on
Middle Eastern issues, has occasionally talked about the coming era of "total
war, '69 indicating that the Bush administration should expand its policy of
"regime change" in Iraq to other countries in the region such as Iran, Syria, and
Saudi Arabia.
In keeping with its role as a cheerleader for U.S. intervention in the Middle
East, JINSA chose to honor Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz...
to receive the 2002 edition of its Henry M. 'Scoop' Jackson public service
award. The corporate sponsor of the affair was Northrop Grumman, a company
that Wolfowitz worked for as a paid consultant prior to joining Rumsfeld's
Pentagon.7"
The fact that neoconservative militarists of the Bush administration are
organically rooted in the military-industrial complex and/or the militant Zionist
supporters of "greater Israel" is even more clearly reflected in their incestuous
relationship with the jingoistic lobbying think tank Project for the New
American Century (PNAC). Like most of its counterpart institutes within the
extensive network of neoconservative think tanks, PNAC was founded by a
circle of powerful political figures a number of whom, including Dick Cheney,
later ascended to key positions in the Bush administration.7 As William
Hartung describes,
In many ways, the founding of PNAC in 1997 marked the opening
salvo in the formation of the Bush policy of aggressive unilateralism.
The signatories of PNAC's founding statement of principles are a
rogue's gallery of intransigent hardliners, ranging from Iran-Contra
re-treat Eliot Cohen, to ex-Pentagon hawks I. Lewis Libby, Paul
Wolfowitz, and Donald Rumsfeld, to neo-con standbys Frank
Gaffney, former Reagan drug czar William Bennett, and Norman
Podhoretz, to the President's brother and partner in electoral crime,
Jeb Bush.72
A closer look at the professional records of the neoconservative players in
the Bush administration indicates that "32 major administration appointees...
are former executives with, consultants for, or significant shareholders of top
68. Id.
69. Id. at 109.
70. Id. at 110-11.
71. See id. at 113.
72. HARTUNG, supra note 4, at 113.
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defense contractors."73 For example, James Roche, former air force secretary
who took over the army, is a former president of Northrop Grumman; his
assistant secretary Nelson Gibbs is another Northrop alumni. An under
secretary at the air force, Peter Teets, was chief operating officer at Lockheed
while Michael Wynne, a Defense Department under secretary, was a former
senior vice-president at General Dynamics.74 Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld himself is an ex-director of a General Dynamics subsidiary, and his
deputy during the first term of the Bush administration, Paul Wolfowitz (now
the head of the World Bank), acted as a paid consultant to Northrop
Grumman.75 Today, point out Hartung and Ciarrocca, the armaments lobby "is
exerting more influence over policymaking than at any time since President
Dwight D. Eisenhower first warned of the dangers of the military-industrial
complex over 40 years ago."76
This sample evidence indicates that the view that the neoconservative
militarists' tendency to war and aggression is inspired by an ideological passion
to spread American ideals of democracy is clearly unwarranted. Their success
in orchestrating the unprovoked war against Iraq stemmed largely from the fact
they were working essentially on behalf of two immensely powerful special
interests, the military-industrial complex and the influential Zionist lobby in the
United States. Neoconservative architects of war and militarism derive their
political clout and policy effectiveness largely from the political machine and
institutional infrastructure of these two powerful interest groups. Thus, to the
extent that the neoconservatives' ascendance to the commanding heights ofU.S.
foreign policy is comparable to a "political coup d'etat," as some observers
have suggested, it is more a coup d'etat that is engineered by some highly
influential special interests than one prompted simply by a handful of starry-
eyed ideologues working out of a commitment to some abstract ideals of
democracy.77
It is also necessary to note at this point that, despite its immense political
influence, the Zionist lobby in the United States is ultimately a junior, not
equal, partner of the military-industrial complex in the military-industrial-
Zionist alliance. Without discounting the extremely important role of the
Zionist lobby in the configuration of the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East,
73. See generally Hartung & Ciarocca, supra note 56; see also MANN, supra note 4; HIRO, supra
note 56.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Hartung & Ciarocca, supra note 56.
77. See generally Pat McDonnell Twair, Carl Boggs, Chalmers Johnson Discuss Neocon Ideology
and American Empire, WASHINGTON REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, June 2004, available at
http://www.wrmea.com/archives/June_2004/0406018.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
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I would caution against simplifications and exaggerations of its power and
influence over the U.S. policy in the region.
It is true that most of the neo-conservative militarists who have been
behind the recent U.S. military expansion and aggression, and who played an
instrumental role in the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, have long been active
supporters of Israel's right-wing politicians and/or leaders. It is also no secret
that there is a close collaboration over issues of war and militarism between
militant Zionism, neoconservative forces in and around the Bush
administration, and jingoistic think tanks such as the American Enterprise
Institute (AEI), Project for the New American Century (PNAC), Middle East
Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Middle East Forum, National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), Jewish Institute
for National Security Affairs (JINSA), and Center for Security Policy (CSP).8
It does not follow, however, that, as some critics argue, the U.S.-Israeli
relationship represents a case of "tail wagging the dog;" that is, the U.S. foreign
policy in the Middle East is shaped by the Israeli/Zionist leaders. While, no
doubt, the powerful Zionist lobby exerts considerable influence over U.S.
foreign policy in the Middle East, the efficacy and the extent of that influence
depend, ultimately, on the real economic and geopolitical interests of U.S.
foreign policy makers. In other words, U.S. policy makers in the Middle East
would go along with the desires and demands of the radical Zionist lobby only
if such demands also tend to serve the special interests that those policy makers
represent or serve-if there is a convergence of interests over those demands.
Aggressive existential tendencies of the U.S. military-industrial empire to
war and militarism are shaped by its own internal or intrinsic dynamics:
continued need for arms production as a lucrative business whose fortunes
depend on permanent war. Conjunctural or reinforcing factors, such as the
horrors of 9/11, the Zionist lobby, the party in power, or the resident of the
White House will, no doubt, exert significant influences. However, such
supporting influences remain essentially contributory, not defining or
determining. The decisive or central role is virtually played by the military-
industrial complex.
C. The Military-Industrial Complex: the Major Force behind the War
Juggernaut
So long as you have a military class, it does not make any difference what
your form of government is; if you are determined to be armed to the teeth, you
78. See generally Hartung & Ciarocca, supra note 56.
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must obey the only men who can control the great machinery of war. Elections
are of minor importance.
- Woodrow Wilson79
The military-industrial-complex [would] cause military spending to be
driven not by national security needs but by a network of weapons makers,
lobbyists and elected officials
- Dwight D. Eisenhower"
Despite their expansionist tendencies, the Founding Fathers of the United
States opposed the idea of maintaining large standing armies on grounds that,
as George Washington put it, a large peacetime military establishment "hath
ever been considered dangerous to the liberties of a country."'" With varying
degrees, this anti-militarist tradition was maintained until the second half of the
twentieth century.
Thus, despite the fact that during that period of over 150 years the United
States engaged in many wars, and the military force was expanded during each
war, demobilization at the end of each conflict reduced the armed forces to their
pre-war size. In keeping with this tradition, the United States embarked on a
major demobilization of the wartime military structure when World War II
hostilities ended in 1944.
But the demobilization did not last long. With the onset of the Cold War
and the U.S. plunge into the Korean War in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
remilitarization began in earnest and on a permanent basis-thereby reversing
that long tradition of more than 150 years of anti-militarism. In constant (2002)
dollars, military spending rose from $150 billion in 1950 (the last year of the
ephemeral postwar demobilization) to $500 billion in 1953.82
The ensuing expansion of the military-industrial complex signified more
than a quantitative growth. Perhaps more importantly, it also resulted, over
time, in a qualitative change: change in the attitude, the sense of mission, and
the historical outlook of the military establishment. As civilian policy makers
relied on military power as the ultimate guarantor of their designs for the post-
war world, the military establishment developed a heightened sense of
identity-an added sense of autonomy, or existential mission, that went beyond
the traditional responsibility for "national security" or for economic and
geopolitical gains abroad. The military establishment gradually began to not
only implement but also increasingly influence policy-to view itself not just
79. SIDNEY LENS, THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 69 (1970).
80. CHARLES BELL, ET AL., THE PERMANENT WAR ECONOMY: REAL SECURITY OR FALSE PROMISE?,
NATIONAL JOBS FOR ALL COALITION, SPECIAL REPORT 4 (JAN. 2004), available at
http://www.njfac.org/sr4.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
81. See LENS, supra note 79, at 13 quoting Congress of the United States of America (June 1784).
82. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 57.
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as a means but also as an end in itself. In other words, protracted reliance on
and steady expansion of the armed forces that started with the onset of the
bipolar world of the Cold War era gradually gave birth to what is historically
called militarism, or parasitic imperialism.83
As was pointed out earlier, there is a historical pattern to this evolution of
militarism out of an over-extended superpower and its over-reliance on the
armed forces for economic and geopolitical gains. Despite the importance of
this distinction between imperialism in the usual sense, that is, economic and/or
geopolitical imperialism, and parasitic/military imperialism, such a distinction
is absent from most of the theories of imperialism in the context of the Bush
administration's aggressive foreign policy, especially its invasion of Iraq.
Whereas imperialism in the usual sense views military force as a means for
economic, territorial, or geopolitical gains, under parasitic imperialism,
instigation of international conflicts and military adventures abroad are often
prompted not so much by a desire to expand the empire's wealth beyond the
existing levels, but by a desire to appropriate the lion's share of the existing
wealth and treasure for the military establishment. It is at such stages that
military operations abroad, as well as gigantic military apparatuses at home,
tend not to be cost effective even from the standpoint of the empire itself.
Today U.S. imperialism seems to have degenerated to this status or stage of
parasitic imperialism.'
The first open challenge to civilian authority by the military-industrial
complex came in the mid-1970s. As the long economic contraction of that
decade and the resulting budgetary constraints forced spending cuts on the
government, policy makers seriously considered curtailment of the Pentagon
budget. A faction of the ruling elite headed by the so-called Trilateralists argued
that, in the face of financial challenges, coupled with the tension-reducing
(ddtente) agreements with the Soviet Union, military spending could be
significantly cut without compromising "national security or global
obligations."85
Faced with the prospects of downsizing, the military-industrial complex
reacted swiftly. The powerful beneficiaries of the Pentagon budget rallied
around Cold Warrior think tanks such as the Committee on the Present Danger
and successfully quashed discussions of military curtailment. Instead, once
again, by hyping up the "threat of communism," they managed to effectively
sabotage the short-lived detente of the first half of the 1970s with the Soviet
Union and replace it with such heightened tensions between the two
superpowers that came to be known as the Second Cold War in the late 1970s
83. For an interesting and informative discussion of the rise ofU.S. militarism, see generally LENS,
supra note 3; JOHNSON, supra note 1; BACEVICH, supra note 3.
84. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 1.
85. See generally SKLAR, supra note 5.
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and early 1980s. It was this successful political maneuvering of the champions
of militarism that paved the way for the early 1980's dramatic "rearming of
America," as President Reagan put it.
86
Since the rationale for the large and growing military apparatus during the
Cold War years was the "threat of communism," U.S. citizens celebrated the
collapse of the Berlin Wall as the end of militarism and the dawn of "peace
dividends"-a reference to the benefits that, it was hoped, many would enjoy
in the United States as a result of a reorientation of part of the Pentagon's
budget toward non-military social needs. Such hopes, however, were quickly
shattered. Instead of declaring the end of the Cold war a victory and
demobilizing the military structure that had been premised upon it, partisans of
war and militarism used it for propaganda purposes and U.S. triumphalism in
order to usher in a new, aggressive and imperial role for the United States.
To stifle the voices that demanded peace dividends, champions of
militarism resorted, once again, to the oldest trick in the books of militarism:
the tried and true pretext of "external threats to our national security/interests."
Instead of the Soviet Union, the "menace of China, rogue states, global
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the axis of evil and militant Islam"
would have to do as new enemies-thereby justifying appropriation of bigger
and bigger shares of national resources for military spending. Having thus
successfully substituted "new sources of threat" for the "communist threat" of
the Cold War era, powerful beneficiaries of military spending managed not only
to maintain but, in fact, expand the Pentagon budget beyond the Cold War
years.8 7
The Bush administration's invasion of Iraq can be better understood
against this backdrop: the unilateral militarists' post-Cold War strategies to
fend off demands for "peace dividends" following the collapse of the Berlin
Wall. 8 Most of such strategies were drafted by Pentagon officials soon after the
demise of the Soviet Union. In his relatively thorough study of the Pentagon's
post-Cold War plans to prevent military/Pentagon downsizing, James Mann of
the Center for Strategic & International Studies points out,
The Berlin Wall came down in November 1989, effectively ending
the Cold War and prompting the Pentagon to undertake a search for
a new set of principles, in part to prevent Congress, then controlled
by the Democrats, from slashing the defense budget. The key
participants were Cheney, Wolfowitz and Colin L. Powell, then
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff... the three men worked closely
together on forestalling cutbacks. The Soviet Union's collapse added
86. See generally id.; see also HALLIDAY, supra note 5.
87. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 1; BACEVICH, supra note 3; MANN, supra note 4.
88. See generally Mann, supra note 22.
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new urgency to their task. "What we were afraid of was people who
would say, 'Let's bring all of the troops home, and lets abandon our
position in Europe,"' recalled Wolfowitz in an interview.89
Mann further points out:
Some of the most important and bitterly debated aspects of the war in
Iraq-including the administration's willingness to engage in
preemptive military action--can be traced to discussions and
documents from the early 1990s, when Pentagon officials, under then-
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and then-Undersecretary of Defense
Paul D. Wolfowitz, led the way in forging a new, post-Cold War
military strategy for the United States."
Most of what the Pentagon team crafted in the early 1990s as the post-Cold
War military strategy is unclassified and well documented. The end product of
those early drafts, which were originally written by Zalmay Khalilzad, then a
Wolfowitz aide and now U.S. ambassador to Iraq, and by I. Lewis "Scooter"
Libby, then principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategy and until
recently Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff, eventually appeared in 1992
as the now well-known Pentagon document titled Defense Planning Guidance
(DPG).9' In January 1993, as the Bush Sr. team left the White House and
Cheney's tenure as Defense Secretary came to an end, the document was
published as a government document under Cheney's name as America's
"Defense Strategy for the 1990s. '"92
Most of the Bush administration's military strategies-unilateralism, pre-
emption, and regime change--can be clearly traced back to Cheney's "Defense
Strategy for the 1990s" of a decade earlier.93 For example, Cheney's document
projected that the United States would build up its military capabilities to such
an extent that there could never be a rival.94 America would develop such
enormous superiority in military power and technology that other countries
would realize it would be self-defeating to try to compete.95 Although the
document gave lip service to collective responses to global conflicts, it also
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Mann, supra note 22.
94. See generally id.
95. Id.
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pointed out that collective action would "not always be timely."96 Therefore, the
document concluded, the United States had to be ready to protect its critical
interests abroad "with only limited additional help, or even alone, if
necessary."97 And while the document did not mention preemption specifically,
it noted that sometimes a measured military action can contain or preclude a
crisis."
The Pentagon's "Defense Strategy for the 1990s" also spoke about
maintaining and expanding America's "strategic depth"-a term coined by the
then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney.99 "Strategic depth" had a geopolitical
connotation, meaning that, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall,
the United States must extend its global presence-in terms of military bases,
listening and/or intelligence stations, and military technology-to areas
previously neutral or under the influence of the Warsaw Pact.' 0
The Clinton administration basically ignored Cheney's "Defense Strategy
for the 1990s" without actually or officially disclaiming it.'0 ' During the 1992
presidential election, Clinton's deputy campaign manager, George
Stephanapoulos, aptly characterized the document as an effort by the Pentagon
to "find an excuse for big budgets instead of downsizing. ' 02
Clinton pursued a policy akin to multilateralism and economic liberalism,
also called (in recent years/decades) neo-liberalism.' 3 He sought to advance
global U.S. interests through further integration of world markets, additional
expansion of multilateral institutions (led by the United States), greater
international free trade, and increased development of international alliances,
including U.S.-led collective military actions."' While representatives of
civilian or non-military transnational capital celebrated Clinton's policies of
neo-liberalism, those of the arms industry and related business spurned those
policies because they were not "sufficiently" lucrative for the beneficiaries of
war dividends.
Clinton's modest increases of the Pentagon budget and his multilateralist
foreign policies fell short of the militarists' expectations, despite the fact he too
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Mann, supra note 22; David Armstrong, Dick Cheney's Song of America,
Montanapeaceseeker.org, available at http://www.montanapeaceseekers.org/common/documents/20021010/
song.php (last visited Sept. 12, 2006).
99. See generally Mann, supra note 22.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Armstrong, supra note 98.
103. Id.
104. Id.
2006]
94 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
had his own share of military operations abroad-in Somalia, Iraq, Haiti, and
various provinces of the former Yugoslavia, for example. 5 Not surprisingly,
the Pentagon authors of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (Cheney,
Wolfowitz, Lewis "Scooter" Libby and their collaborators) vehemently
criticized his "defense" policies as inept and passive.'0 6 They called on the
Clinton administration to "finish thej ob [of overthrowing Saddam Hussein after
his military forces were driven out of Kuwait] by arming Iraqi opposition forces
and sending U.S. ground troops to defend a base of operation for them in the
southern region of the country."' 0' 7 In a 1996 editorial, Paul Wolfowitz, one of
the authors of the 1992 "Defense Planning Guidance," raised the prospect of
launching a preemptive attack against Iraq: "' [s]hould we sit idly by,' he wrote,
'with our passive containment policy and our inept covert operations, and wait
until a tyrant possessing large quantities of weapons of mass destruction and
sophisticated delivery systems strikes out at us?"" 08
As expected, the Pentagon critics of President Clinton's military and
foreign policies celebrated his departure from the White House, and the
ascension of George W. Bush to the presidency, as the opportunity they were
seeking to implement their long-shelved Defense Planning Guidance, including
the plan to "finish the job" of ousting Saddam Hussein, was presented to
them.'0 9 Even as the vote count was still being disputed in Florida, and the
Supreme Court was deliberating George W. Bush's dubious claim to victory,
Dick Cheney moved from Texas to Washington, D.C, with a huge entourage
and fanfare, camped out next to the White House, and stacked the would-be
Bush administration with other Pentagon hawks, including all of his co-authors
of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance."0
While Cheney's and his hand-picked civilian militarists' de facto
occupation of the White House may not have played as an important role in
George W. Bush's rise to the White House as the Supreme Court decision, it
nonetheless played a key role in influencing the outcome of that controversial
election-a role that largely skipped the attention it deserved.
Thus, with the accession of George W. Bush to the presidency, all the
Pentagon contributors to the early 1990s Defense Planning Guidance also
returned to positions of power in the government. 1' Cheney of course became
Vice President, Powell became Secretary of State, Wolfowitz moved into the
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Armstrong, supra note 98.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
[Vol. 13:1
Hossein-Zadeh
number two position at the Pentagon, as Donald Rumsfeld's deputy, and Lewis
"Scooter" Libby, who served as Wolfowitz's Deputy during Bush Sr.'s
administration, became the Vice President's Chief of Staff and National
Security Adviser.'
1 2
Although George W. Bush's administration thus arrived in the White
House with plans of "regime change" in the Middle East, it could not carry out
those plans without a pretext. Before 9/11, the militarists in and around the
administration were without tools and excuses to drum up public and political
support for the war on Iraq. The 9/11 attacks provided the needed pretext. The
administration wasted no time manipulating the public's fear of further terrorist
attacks to rally support for the invasion of Iraq, which had nothing to do with
the attacks. It heightened people's fear by constant terror warnings, while
marketing the "war on terrorism" as an epic battle between "good and evil."
Soon after the heinous attacks of 9/11, the Pentagon dusted off the 1992
Defense Planning Guidance, replaced Cheney's name with Rumsfeld's, and
promoted it as the Defense Planning Guidance for the "new, post-9/11
circumstance." James Mann, author of The Rise of Vulcans: the History of
Bush's War Cabinet, describes:
The Clinton administration set aside Cheney's vision without actually
repudiating it. A decade later, as the second Bush administration
moved toward war with Iraq, the ideas in the 1992 document took on
heightened significance. What the Pentagon officials had succeeded in
doing, within months of the Soviet collapse, was to lay out the
intellectual blueprint for a new world dominated-then, now and in the
future-by U.S. military power." 3
The Pentagon's post-9/11 version of Defense Planning Guidance retains-
indeed, strengthens-all the major elements of the 1992 version, although at
times it uses slightly modified terminology." 14 The preemptive attacks projected
in the original document are now called "unwarned attacks." ' 5 The old Powell-
Cheney doctrine of military "forward presence," put forth in the early 1990s in
response to the demise of the Soviet Union, is now called "forwarded
deterrence."" 6 And the use of overwhelming force to defeat an enemy called for
in that old doctrine is now branded as "effects based" vision." 7 But the new
112. Armstrong, supra note 98.
113. See generally Mann, supra note 22; see also MANN, supra note 4; Armstrong, supra note 98.
114. Armstrong, supra note 98.
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version also adds a few new ideas, including the incredibly dangerous concept
of "preemptive strikes" with nuclear weapons: "[t]hese would be earth-
penetrating nuclear weapons used for attacking 'hardened and deeply buried
targets' such as command-and-control bunkers, missile silos, and heavily
fortified underground facilities used to build and store weapons of mass
destruction." '" The new version also directs the military to develop cyber-,
laser-, and electronic-warfare capabilities to enhance global capabilities of the
U.S. military might.' 19
As the administration was preparing for the invasion of Iraq in early 2003,
it also revealed the refurbished Defense Planning Guidance as the "Bush
Doctrine" for the new, post-9/11 world. 20 After Rumsfeld's signing of the
document in May 2002, the Pentagon leaked it to The Los Angeles Times in July
and the administration officially endorsed it on the occasion of President Bush's
2002 West Point speech. It is worth noting that what was once called the
"Wolfowitz Doctrine" by Pentagon insiders came to be re-labeled as the "Bush
Doctrine."'' As David Armstrong points out,
Commentators parrot the administration's line, portraying the concept
of preemptory strikes as a 'new' strategy aimed at combating
terrorism... [yet] Preemption, of course, is just part of the Plan, and
the Plan is hardly new. It is a warmed-over version of the strategy
Cheney and his coauthors rolled out in 1992 as the answer to the end
of the Cold War.'22
That the U.S. military response to the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989
and its response to the collapse of the World Trade Towers in 2001 were
basically the same should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the
dynamics or market imperatives of the business of war: continued increase of
the Pentagon budget and/or continued expansion of sales markets for the war
industry and related businesses.'23 This also confirms the overriding argument
of this study: that the pretexts or tactics for pursuing higher profits for the
business of war may change (from the "threat of communism" to the "threat of
rogue states, of global terrorism, of axis of evil, of militant Islam,.. .") but the
118. Id.
119. Armstrong, supra note 98.
120. Id.
121. See id
122. Id.
123. See generally id
[Vol. 13:1
Hossein-Zadeh
objective or strategy remains the same-war and militarism and, consequently,
further escalation of the Pentagon budget and war dividends.'24
This brief review of the events that led to the invasion of Iraq in early 2003
clearly reveals that the plans for the invasion were drawn up nearly a dozen
years earlier. As William Hartung and Michelle Ciarrocca of the World Policy
Institute write:
Each major element of the Bush administration's national security...
was developed and refined before the Bush administration took
office, at corporate-backed conservative think tanks like the Center
for Security Policy, the National Institute for Public Policy and the
Project for a New American Century .... Unilateralist ideologues
formerly affiliated with these think tanks, along with the 32 major
administration appointees who are former executives with, consultants
for, or significant shareholders of top defense contractors, are driving
U.S. foreign and military policy.'25
This is a clear indication of the fact that the cabal of neoconservative
militarists is more akin to the executive arm of some real, powerful special
interests than a group of starry-eyed ideologues committed to the goal of
spreading democracy worldwide.
IV. IN SUMMARY
By focusing primarily on the systemic or internal dynamics of the military-
industrial complex as an existentially-driven juggernaut to war and militarism,
this study provides a welcome challenge to most of the prevailing critiques that
attribute the rising militarization of U.S. foreign policy to big oil, to the
ideological power of the neoconservatives, to George W. Bush's unseasoned
and near-missionary approach to Presidency, or to America's idealism to spread
democracy.
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